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Chapter 8. Reverse engineering

The majority of the development time needed for qdmr, consists of reverse engineering the code plug and communication protocols of the radios. Fortunately, many radios share the same communication protocol, in particular those from the same manufacturer. Sometimes these protocols are even used by other manufacturers. Even if the protocol is already implemented in qdmr, you may need to reverse engineer the code plug format. This step has to be performed always, even if an already implemented code plug is reused, you will need to verify that format. Any mistake here, may brick your device.

Note

Before you attempt to reverse engineer anything, consider to invest some significant time in research. Reverse engineering is an cumbersome and frequently frustrating task, there is no need to waste your valuable time on something, that someone else has already done. Also, consider documenting and publishing your results, so others can find it, even if it is incomplete. Someone else might pickup your work and complete it.

In the following sections, I attempt to describe, how I approach reverse engineering the communication protocols and code plugs. To this end, I hope it might help you in your reverse engineering work. And if you like, you may contribute your work to qdmr.

Reverse engineering communication protocols

There is no one ultimate way to successfully reverse engineer a communication protocol. But some methods are very common. First, one needs to get some captures of the communication between the manufacturer codeplug programming software (CPS) and the radio of interest. The majority of theses radios will communicate via USB. Hence, some means are needed to capture USB traffic.

There is an application, called Wireshark (https://www.wireshark.org/). This application is usually used to capture and analyze network traffic. It can, however, also capture traffic from USB. How this is done, depends a bit on the operating system you are using. If you want to capture and analyze the communication under Windows™, read the instructions at https://wiki.wireshark.org/CaptureSetup/USB. This makes sense, as you need a windows installation, to run the manufacturer CPS.

I personally prefer to work under Linux, to this end, I've installed Windows in a virtual machine, but capture the USB traffic under the host Linux system. To do that, the usbmon kernel module must be loaded. If loaded, Wireshark will show USB as a capture source.

Once, capturing USB traffic works, connect the radio to the host. You may need to allow the guest system to have access to the USB device. Then fire up the manufacturer CPS, start capturing in Wireshark and start a codeplug read. Stop capturing once the read is complete. Save the captured data and restart the capturing. Then write the codeplug back to the device, stop the capture and save it in another file.

These files now contain all packets send and received by the PC over USB. In a next step, the packets must be filtered and inspected. To do that, I personally prefer to write short Python scripts. The pyshark package provides means to read packages from the capture file and access their content. This allows to filter those packages to and from the device, that contain the actual payload to and from the device.

Please note, that may radios may misuse some already existing protocols over USB. Some Radioddity and Baofeng devices use the HID specification to transfer data to and from the device. Others may use the DFU specification (TyT, Retevis), mass storage (CSi) or simply serial-over-USB (AnyTone). Irrespective of the underlying specification used to send data to the device, the payload of these packages must be extracted.

To do that, use Wireshark to inspect these packages by hand. Search for a packet, that was definitely send to or by the device and note the USB (URB) device address. This is the best way to filter all packets to and from the device.

Example 8.1. Some simple example to filter packages by device address and destination/source.

import pyshark

packages = pyshark.FileCapture(FILENAME, include_raw=True, use_json=True)
device_address = '9' # just an example

for package in packages:
  if device_address != package.usb.device_address:
    continue
  if "host" == package.usb.src:
    # From host to device.
  else if "host" == package.usb.dst:
    # From device to host.
  

This example shows how to filter only those packets to and from a specific device and also dispatch depending on the destination and source of the packet. That is, if the packet was send by the host or the device.

In a next step, the captured payload must be inspected. If the packet contains any additional payload data, the usb.data_length field will be set. Then, there is a field called usb.capdata_raw. Unfortunately, that field name contains a dot, so you need to access it differently. That is

  # [...] 
  if int(package.usb.data_length):
    data = package["usb.capdata_raw"].value
  # [...]

The extracted data is hex string. Now comes the difficult part. Staring at these packets and making sense of them. Usually, the communication is performed in a strict command-response structure. That is, the host sends a request packet and the device responses with a single packet. This eases the analysis a lot, as the communication is always initiated by the host and the association between the request and the response packets are trivial.

Identifying the communication structure

A typical communication with the device is performed in three steps: First, the radio is identified and brought into a programming mode. Several packets might be needed to perform this task. In that state, the radio usually displays some message on the screen or blinks an LED.

The second step consists of the actual codeplug transfer. There, a large amount of packets are send. This step is usually easy to find within the captured packets, as a large number of equally sized packets are exchanged. Sometimes, a relatively large amount of data is read or written at once. This can be spotted easily, as basic control commands of the first step are usually pretty short.

Frequently, these packets contain an address field or sequence number used to specify where the codeplug data chunk is written to or read from. These fields are of upmost importance and need to be identified. They are, however, easy to spot, as this field is likely constantly increasing, with a fixed increment from packet to packet.

The final step usually is to reboot the radio or leaving the programming mode. This is commonly performed by a single packet. Sometimes, the device reboots immediately and no response to the command is received by the host.

Once the protocol structure is identified, that is, the purpose of the single packets is known, the actual work of identifying the packet structure can start.

Identifying the packet format

The actual packet format will be much harder to reverse engineer. I cannot give any general suggestions on how to figure out the meaning of each byte in a packet. However, I can give you some examples. This might help in reverse engineering new protocols as the structure of the packets will be different, but the concepts remain the same. For example, read and write commands must somehow specify an address to read from and write to as well as the amount of data to read or write. This might be helpful

Let us inspect some packets send and received from an AnyTone device.

Example 8.2. Capture of a codeplug read from an AnyTone AT-D578UV

> 50 52 4f 47 52 41 4d                            | PROGRAM
< 51 58 06                                        | QX.

> 02                                              | .
< 49 44 35 37 38 55 56 00 12 56 31 31 30 00 00 06 | ID578UV..V110...

> 52 02 64 00 00 10                               | R.d...
< 57 02 64 00 00 10 fe ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | W.d.............
| ff ff ff ff ff ff 65 06                         | ......e.

> 52 02 64 00 10 10                               | R.d...
< 57 02 64 00 10 10 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | W.d.............
| ff ff ff ff ff ff 76 06                         | ......v.

> 52 02 64 00 20 10                               | R.d. .
< 57 02 64 00 20 10 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | W.d. ...........
| ff ff ff ff ff ff 86 06                         | ........

...

> 52 01 64 08 80 10                               | R.d...
< 57 01 64 08 80 10 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff | W.d.............
| ff ff ff ff ff ff ee 06                         | ........

> 52 02 48 02 00 10                               | R.H...
< 57 02 48 02 00 10 01 08 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff | W.H.............
| ff ff ff ff ff ff 59 06                         | ......Y.

... 

The Example 8.2, “Capture of a codeplug read from an AnyTone AT-D578UV” shows a capture of the data exchanged between the host and an AnyTone AT-D578UV during a codeplug read. Everything starting with > is send from the host to the device, while everything starting with < is send by the device to the host.

The first packet send, is the ASCII string PROGRAM. This causes the device to enter the programming mode. A message will be shown on the screen of the device. This is then acknowledged by the device with a short message QX followed by a single 06h byte. The last byte appears to be weird, but it will always be present on any response from the device. This might be seen as an end-of-packet byte.

The next command send by the host is pretty simple. It consists of a single 02h byte. The device responds with a 15 bytes long ID string, identifying the device name and hardware version followed by the 06h end-of-packet byte.

After this, the actual codeplug read appears to start. The host sends a series of equally size commands, each starting with an R followed by 5 bytes of payload. As mentioned above, this payload must contain some sort of memory address and length field, to specify how much to read and from where. To figure that out, one may study subsequent read requests.

The payloads of the first tree read read requests are

02 64 00 00 10
02 64 00 10 10
02 64 00 20 10

The only difference of these requests is the fourth byte. Hence, one may assume, that this byte is part of the address field. However, we do not know wich bytes are part of the address as well.

The responses to these requests also contain these bytes as well as 18 more bytes of payload. It is reasonable that the transfer size is a power of two. So the request likely reads 16 bytes from the device. 16 in hex is 10h, hence one may assume that the last byte specifies the amount of data to read. Hence we identified the size field as the fifth byte of the read request payload data.

As the address increases by 10h from request to request, one may infer, that the read request specifies the address to read from, not the sequence or block number of a read from. As the entire Codeplug will not fit into 256 bytes, the address field must be larger. Even 64kb will be too small, to hold the entire codeplug, the address is likely a 32bit integer.

This does not need to be true. Some radios will implement special commands to select the memory bank beforehand. Then each 64kB bank can be accessed with a 16bit address.

To verify our assumption, we will study some read requests, that appear much later and check if the first bytes change as well. And indeed, much later, we observe read request payloads like

01 64 08 80 10
02 48 02 00 10

Obviously, these bytes change too. Consequently, we may assume that the address is stored as a 32bit unsigned integer in big-endian byte-order. Finally, we may summarize the read request format as

+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|'R'| Address       | N |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+

Where N is the number of bytes to read.

Now, it is time to study the structure of the read response. As we already reverse engineered the read request, the read response is then easy to understand. Each of these responses start with a W char, followed by the same address and length as send by the request. That is

> 52 02 64 00 00 10
< 57 02 64 00 00 10 fe ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 65 06

Obviously the 16 byte data read, follows the length byte. The last byte is the common 06h end-of-packet byte, we have already seen. So a single unknown 65h byte is still unknown.

This byte might be some sort of checksum over the payload. Checksums are notoriously difficult to figure out. Frequently, common techniques like CRC16 are used. Here, a single checksum byte is used, hence one of the common checksums is unlikely. Now starts some guesswork. We may compare some very similar read responses to get an idea, how this checksum may work. For example

57 02 64 00 10 10 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 76 06
57 02 64 00 20 10 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 86 06

The only difference between these two responses is one byte in the address, the remaining payload is identical. The address also only differs by 10h like the checksum. So one may assume, that the checksum is simply the sum over the payload bytes. Summing all bytes of the latter up to the checksum gets 10ddh. Of cause, this is not the checksum directly. The checksum is a single byte. But the least significant byte of the sum (ddh), however, does not match.

Maybe, the sum is not taken over the entire payload, but over the part that actually matters. That is, the address, length and data fields. This time, the sum is 1086h and this time, the least significant byte (86h) matches the checksum. Now, we can summarize the read response format as

+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+...+---+---+---+
|'W'| Address       | N | Data (N)  |CRC|06h|
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+...+---+---+---+

where the CRC is the least significant byte of the sum over the address, length and data payload.